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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the :Matter of the Estate
of
SAM N. l\fANATAKIS, sometimes
known as Sam Manatakis, and as
Sotiros N. Manatakis and as Sam
Nekas,
Deceased.

No. 8534

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE
This is .an appeal by the Walker Bank and Trust
Company, Administrator of the estate of the above
named decedent, from a decree ordering the administrator to distribute the residue of the estate to Salt Lake
County in trust and for the use and benefit of the Salt
Lake County Hospital located .at 2033 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
The above named decedent died on April 18, 1955
at Salt Lake City, Utah and in his safety deposit box
there was found two olographic Wills, one being undated
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has been disregarded, and the one under which the decree
was entered by the trial court reads rus follows:
"February 26, 1954

"WILL
"All the money I have in my name Sam
Manatakis or Sam N ekas I leave to the public
hospital or County Hospital for the poor.
(signed) SAM

~IANATAKIS

- SAM NEKAS"

There was no evidence offered at the hearing except
a stipulation (R. 10-11) entered into by the parties to
the effect that the records of the Salt Lake County Hospital do not show that the decedent at any time was a
patient at said hospital and that he died at St. Mark's
Hospital. Pursuant to such stipulation and in considering said \Viii the trial court entered the judgment as
aforesaid ordering distribution of the residue of said
estate to Salt Lake County for the use and benefit of
its hospital.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The evidence is insufficient to support the findings of the Court that under the \Yill of said decedent
Salt Lake County Hospital was na1ned as the sole beneficiary of the estate of said decedent.

2. The Findings and Conclusions are insufficient to
support the decree that the residue of the estate of the
decedent was left to Salt Lake County a body politic
and corporate of the State of Utah, and be held in trust
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for the use and benefit of the Salt Lake County Hospital
located at 2033 South State Street, Salt L.ake City, Utah.
3. The legatee named in the \Vill is indefinite, ambiguous and uncertain, and the Will is therefore void for
want of certainty.
4. That the Will is indefinite, ambiguous and uncertain in designating a leg.atee and in defining the object
and use of the monies to be distributed.
5. That Salt Lake County does not have power to
receive testamentary dispositions.
ARGUMENT
POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 4
EVIDENCE, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DECREE DISTRIBUTING
THE RESIDUE OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE TO SALT LAKE
COUNTY FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY HOSPITAL IN THAT SAID WILL DOES NOT
DEFINITELY DESIGNATE A LEGATEE OR SUFFICIENTLY DEFINE THE OBJECT OF THE USE OF THE MONIES
TO BE DISTRIBUTED.

For the purpose of comparison decedent's \Vill is
again set forth:
"February 26, 1954

"WILL
"All the money I have in my name Sam
l\i.anatakis or Sam N ekas I leave to the public
hospital or County Hospital for the poor.
(signed) SAM MANATAKIS - SAM NEKAS"
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The trial judge in making and entering the court's
findings and conclusions adjudged the Will to read as
follows:

WILL
All the money I have in my name, Sam Manatakis or Sam N ekas, I leave to Salt Lake County,
a body politic and corporate of the State of Utah,
to be held in trust for the use and benefit of the
Salt Lake County Hospital located at 2033 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The main question to be considered is whether or not
the decedent's Will clearly expresses the intention of the
testator as to what person or persons are entitled to the
distribution of the residue of his estate. In other words,
did the trial court resort to speculation and conjecture
in finding that Salt Lake County Hospital was the intended sole legatee under the testator's Will.
In Section 74-2-2 of Utah Code Annotated 1953, it
is stated:
"In case of uncertainty arising upon the face
of a will as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the will, taking into view the
circumstances under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations."
In Page on \Yills. Sec. 5±. the rule on certainty
of a Will is stated as follows :
"The intention of testator to 1nake testantentary disposition of his property, or to appoint
an executor or a testamentary guardian, must be
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expressed in such terms that the court can determine what was his wish without resort to conjecture. Both the thing given .and the person to
whom it is given 1nust, in testamentary disposition of property, be set forth with such certainty
that the court can give effect to such gift when
the estate is to be distributed. * * *
The identity of the legatees must be reasonably certain. If the legatee can not be identified
properly after considering the terms of the Will,
the surrounding circumstances, and other admissible extrinsic evidence, the gift is void."
In re Zilke's Estate, 1 Pac. 2nd 475, the Testator
left an olographic Will which was duly admitted to probate and read as follows :
"When I am dead I wont everyting to go to
Offens home of San-Francisco. You find everyting in box 3608 I-Iumbolt Bank. This is my last
Will.
"M.arch 20, 1927.

Edward J. A. Zilke."

Upon a hearing of the Petition for Distribution the
heirs at law and next of kin of the deceased claimed that
they were entitled to the proceeds of the estate upon the
ground that the Will was uncertain, and that the intention so ambiguous that the Will was void. The trial Court
held that a number of orphan asylums situated in the
City and County of San Francisco, seven in number,
were entitled to the proceeds of the estate.
The Court reversed the decree and stated:
"If it appeared that there was no institution
bearing the n.ame used in the will and that there
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were seven institutions conducted as orphans'
homes in San Francisco, a latent ambiguity arose,
which ambiguity might have been removed by
other evidence. In Taylor v. 1\'IcCowen, 154 Cal.
798, the court at page 802, 99 P. 351, 353, quoted
with approval the following language from Patch
v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 6 S. Ct. 617, 710, 29 L. Ed.
860: 'It is settled doctrine that, as a latent ambiguity is only disclosed by extrinsic evidence,
it may be rmnoved by extrinsic evidence. Such an
ambiguity may arise upon a will, either when it
names a person as the object of a gift, or .a thing
as the subject of it, and there are two persons or
things that answer the name or description; or
* * *' No evidence was offered to remove the
ambiguity in the present case, and we are compelled to resort to the terms of the will alone in
an effort to ascertain the intention of the testator.
Civ. Code 1318. Under these circumstances, the
question of the propriety of the decree is solely
a question of law. Estate of Langdon, 129 Cal.
451, 62 p. 73.
"It is a statutorv rule of construction that
'The words of a will a~e to be taken in their ordinary and grmnmatic.al sense, unless a clear intention to use then1 in another sense can be collected,
and that other can be ascertained.' (Ci-v. Code,
1324.) If the will had provided that the estate
should go to the orphans' 'hon1es' of San Franri~eo, we do not doubt that the decree entered
would have been proper, assunring, of course,
that respondents represented all of the institutions falling in that elass. See Estate of Pearsons,
113 Cal. 577, 45 P. 849, 106:2. and Estate of Pear~on~, 1:25 Cal. :2S5, 57 P. 1015. The will, however,
provided that the estate should go to the orphans'
'h01ne' of S.an Francisco. Counsel for respondents
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state that 'The case turns solely on the importance
of the omission of the letter 's' from the word
"home",' and that such omission is 'frail ground
indeed for the argument that the will should be
invalidated and the charities deprived of the testator's intended benefaction.' But who can say from
the terms of the will that the letter's' was not intentionally omitted and that the testator did not
have a particular home in mind as the recipient of
his benefaction~ This appears to be quite probable when we consider that the testator employed
a capital letter at the beginning of the word
'Offens,' which may be some indication that he
was endeavoring to employ the name of some one
institution. In any event he used the singular and
not plural, and we are of the opinion that the language used is insufficient to support a decree in
favor of all orphans' homes or in favor of any
particular orphans' home, in the absence of some
evidence other than the will itself to show what the
testator's intention was. The situation before us
is much the s.ame as though the testator had provided in his will that his entire estate should go
to his 'niece' and the court had distributed the
estate to all of his 'nieces' solely upon the showing that there was more than one person answering that description. In such case, it is clear that
the decree could not stand. It is true as contended
by respondents, that misspelling and grammatical inaccuracies in a will are ordinarily of no
consequence, but this rule is properly qualified
in the citation quoted by respondents as follows:
'Grammatical inaccuracies are immaterial, provided the intention appears * * *' 17 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law ( 2d Ed.) p. 20.

"It may be that the testator intended to leave
his property in equal shares to all orphans' homes
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in San Francisco as a class, or, on the other hand,
it may be (and it appears more likely) that he
intended a bequest to some particular orphans'
home. Whatever his actual intention may have
been, he failed to express it with reasonable certainty, and it is impossible to ascertain it from the
will itself. Upon the record before us, the decree
is based upon speculation and conjecture as to
what his intention was. As was said in Estate of
Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430, at page 432, 181 P. 645,
'Courts are not permitted, in order to avoid .a
conclusion of intestacy, to adopt a construction
based on conjecture as to what the testator may
have intended, although not expressed.' And
again on page 433 of 180 Cal., 181 P. 645, 646,
'Only through speculation and conjecture may the
construction contended for by appellants be confirmed. And this can not be countenanced in view
of the cardinal rule to the effect that in the interpretation of wills it is not the probable intent
which may have existed in the mind of the testatrix which prevails, but only that which is expressed in the language of the will.'
"For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the
decree appealed from is reversed."
In re Hopes Estate, 98 A.6~~' the Testator bequeathed a share of hi~ estate to any hospital in the city
of Philadelphia that should be devoted to the treatment
of contagious diseases for the purpose of endowing a
ward therein, and provided a gift even if there be no such
hospital at the ti1ne the legacy becan1e payable.

Held: that the Testator intended a gift to a hospital devoted to the treatment of contagious diseases and
not a hospital containing a ward or isolation ward where
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such diseases were incidentally treated, or to a hospital
that was willing to establish such a ward for the treatment of such diseases, and so, there being no hospital for
the treatment of such diseases the gift failed.
In Board of Trustees of M. E. Church v. May, 99
A.1093, the bequest was as follows: "The remainder to
be given to the Methodist E. Church, South, and Missionary Cause." This bequest was held indefinite and
void as the words "and Missionary Cause" were too
vague.
In the Will under consideration there are several
matters which render the Will void because of uncertainty in the expression of the Testator's intention, namely:
(1) The Testator fails to state the territorial location of the public or county hospital that is referred to in
his Will. It is only by conjecture and surmise that one
can assume that the Testator's reference to the county
hospital refers to the hospital conducted by Salt Lake
County. There is no evidence that the Testator was ever
treated in the Salt Lake County IIospital or that he
expressed to anyone a desire to leave his money to the
Salt Lake County llospital.
(2) The Will is contradictory in that the attempted
devise is in the .alternative, to-wit: "to the public hospital
or County Hospital for the poor." Who can say with
certainty from reading of the vVill that the Testator's
chief intention was that the residue of his estate be distributed to St. Mark's Hospital or some other hospital
outside of Salt Lake County, or the State of Utah. Let
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us .assume that the Will read as follows: "I leave all
my money to John Brown or William Brown." Who can
say from construing the language of such a Will who is
entitled to the distribution of the estate~
(3) There is no evidence adduced before the Court
that throws any light as to whom the Testator intended
to leave his money as the name of the beneficiary is v.agne
and uncertain, and the locality of the devisee lacking.
To determine from reading the will that the
decedent intended to give his estate to Salt Lake County
for the poor it is necessary to read into the will the words
"Salt Lake", which do not ,appear. Further, the will
states that he leaves his money for the poor. The will
is vague and ambiguous as to how it shall be used in
helping and assisting the poor.
( 4)

POINT 5
SALT LAKE COUNTY DOES NOT HAVE POWER TO
RECEIVE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS.

It is generally recognized that the power to acquire
a bequest or take a testamentary disposition of property
depends upon the will of the Legislature.
In Section 74-1-4 of Ftah Code Annotated 1953, it
is stated:
"WHO l\fAY TAKE UNDER 1VILL. A testamentary disposition may be n1ade to any
person or corporation capable by law of taking
the property so disposed of by deed or assignment
or other transaction between living persons."
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The Legislature has provided that the agriculture
college, Sec. 53-31-4 U.C.A. 1953; art institute, Sec. 64-218 U.C.A. 1953; deaf and blind school, Sec. 64-3-2 U.C.A.
1953; fair association, Sec. 64-4-1 U.C.A. 1953; nonprofit
corporations, Sec. 16-6-8 U.C.A. 1953; state hospital, Sec.
64-7-4 U.C.A. 1953; and state university, Sec. 53-30-3
U.C.A. 1953 may take testamentary disposition of property under a Will. Nowhere in the statutes of this State
has a Legislature empowered a county to take property
under a testamentary disposition.
In 43 C.J. page 1337 it is stated: "It is a gener.al rule,
however, that a municipal corporation cannot take and
hold property in trust for a purpose which is foreign to
the objects of its incorporation, and in which it has no
interest."
In Dailey v. New Haven, 22 A. 945, the Testator bequeathed to the city $130,000.00 for the use of the poor.
It was held that in the absence of authority granted by
its charter a city had no power to accept the bequest in
trust to apply towards income from furnishing necessities
to the poor.
Likewise in Au,gusta v. Walton, 1 S.E. 214, it was
held that municipal authorities had no right under the
laws of Georgia to accept or administer a trust for the
benefit of the poor.
The Legislature has not granted Salt Lake County
any authority or power to accept benefits. Not having
such power the County is not in .a position to accept the
bequest or to administer the same. A lack of such power
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forbids the County from seeking to enforce the testamentary disposition in this case.
The County will probably cite Section 17-5-44 Utah
Code Annotated 1953 as an authority that the County
has been granted power to receive testamentary bequests,
which Section reads as follows :
"They may receive from the United States
or other sources, lands and other property granted or donated to the County for the purpose of
aiding in the erection of County buildings, roads,
bridges or for other specific purposes may use the
same therefor, and may provide for sale of the
same and the application of the proceeds thereof."
The ,above statute refers specifically to donations,
having in mind lands or buildings, roads or bridges, that
may be donated by the United States or some other
source to aid the County in carrying on its business.
There is nothing in the statute referring to any testamentary bequests. There is considerable difference between a donation and .a bequest. The donee may refuse a
donation because it 1nay be a burden. For instance, the
Count)~ may refuse a parcel of land that someone may
want to donate to it upon the ground that the up-keep
may be too burdensmne on the Uupayers.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant sub1nits that the decedent's Will is
indefinite and uncertain and should be declared void for
uncertainty. Further, Salt Lake County does not have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
power to receive testamentary dispositions. Therefore,
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
the monies in the estate be distributed to decedent's
heirs.
Respectfully submitted,

H. G. METOS,
Attorney for Appellant
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